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Abstract—Outsourcing data and computation to cloud server provides a cost-effective way to support large scale data storage and query
processing. However, due to security and privacy concerns, sensitive data (e.g., medical records) need to be protected from the cloud server
and other unauthorized users. One approach is to outsource encrypted data to the cloud server and have the cloud server perform query
processing on the encrypted data only. It remains a challenging task to support various queries over encrypted data in a secure and efficient
way such that the cloud server does not gain any knowledge about the data, query, and query result. In this paper, we study the problem of
secure skyline queries over encrypted data. The skyline query is particularly important for multi-criteria decision making but also presents
significant challenges due to its complex computations. We propose a fully secure skyline query protocol on data encrypted using
semantically-secure encryption. As a key subroutine, we present a new secure dominance protocol, which can be also used as a building
block for other queries. Furthermore, we demonstrate two optimizations, data partitioning and lazy merging, to further reduce the computation
load. Finally, we provide both serial and parallelized implementations and empirically study the protocols in terms of efficiency and scalability
under different parameter settings, verifying the feasibility of our proposed solutions.
Index Terms—Skyline, Secure, Efficient, Parallel, Semi-honest.
✦
1 Introduction
As an emerging computing paradigm, cloud computing attracts
increasing attention from both research and industry communities.
Outsourcing data and computation to cloud server provides a cost-
effective way to support large scale data storage and query pro-
cessing. However, due to security and privacy concerns, sensitive
data need to be protected from the cloud server as well as other
unauthorized users.
Fig. 1: Secure similarity queries.
A common approach to protect the confidentiality of out-
sourced data is to encrypt the data (e.g., [15], [34]). To protect the
confidentiality of the query from cloud server, authorized clients
also send encrypted queries to the cloud server. Figure 1 illustrates
our problem scenario of secure query processing over encrypted
data in the cloud. The data owner outsources encrypted data to the
cloud server. The cloud server processes encrypted queries from
the client on the encrypted data and returns the query result to
the client. During the query processing, the cloud server should
not gain any knowledge about the data, data patterns, query, and
query result.
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Fully homomorphic encryption schemes [15] ensure strong
security while enabling arbitrary computations on the encrypted
data. However, the computation cost is prohibitive in practice.
Trusted hardware such as Intel’s Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) brings a promising alternative, but still has limitations in
its security guarantees [10]. Many techniques (e.g., [18], [40])
have been proposed to support specific queries or computations
on encrypted data with varying degrees of security guarantee and
efficiency (e.g., by weaker encryptions). Focusing on similarity
search, secure k-nearest neighbor (kNN) queries, which return k
most similar (closest) records given a query record, have been
extensively studied [12], [21], [42], [44].
In this paper, we focus on the problem of secure skyline
queries on encrypted data, another type of similarity search im-
portant for multi-criteria decision making. The skyline or Pareto
of a multi-dimensional dataset given a query point consists of the
data points that are not dominated by other points. A data point
dominates another if it is closer to the query point in at least one
dimension and at least as close to the query point in every other
dimension. The skyline query is particularly useful for selecting
similar (or best) records when a single aggregated distance metric
with all dimensions is hard to define. The assumption of kNN
queries is that the relative weights of the attributes are known
in advance, so that a single similarity metric can be computed
between a pair of records aggregating the similarity between all
attribute pairs. However, this assumption does not always hold
in practical applications. In many scenarios, it is desirable to
retrieve similar records considering all possible relative weights of
the attributes (e.g., considering only one attribute, or an arbitrary
combination of attributes), which is essentially the skyline or the
“pareto-similar” records.
Motivating Example. Consider a hospital who wishes to out-
source its electronic health records to the cloud and the data is
encrypted to ensure data confidentiality. Let P denote a sample
heart disease dataset with attributes ID, age, trestbps (resting
2blood pressure). We sampled four patient records p1, ...,p4 from
the heart disease dataset of UCI machine learning repository
[23] as shown in Table 1(a) and Figure 2. Consider a physician
who is treating a heart disease patient q = (41, 125) and wishes
to retrieve similar patients in order to enhance and personalize
the treatment for patient q. While it is unclear how to define
the attribute weights for kNN queries (p1 is the nearest if only
age is considered while p2, p3 are the nearest if only trestbps is
considered), skyline provides all pareto-similar records that are
not dominated by any other records. Skyline includes all possible
1NN results by considering all possible relative attribute weights,
and hence can serve as a filter for users. Given the query q, we
can map the data points to a new space with q as the origin and
the distance to q as the mapping function. The mapped records
ti[ j] = |pi[ j]−q[ j]|+q[ j] on each dimension j are shown in Table
1(b) and also in Figure 2. It is easy to see that t1 and t2 are skyline
in the mapped space, which means p1 and p2 are skyline with
respect to query q.
Our goal is for the cloud server to compute the skyline query
given q on the encrypted data without revealing the data, the
query q, the final result set {p1, p2}, as well as any intermediate
result (e.g., t2 dominates t4) to the cloud. We note that skyline
computation (with query point at the origin) is a special case of
skyline queries.
TABLE 1: Sample of heart disease dataset.
(a) Original data.
ID age trestbps
p1 40 140
p2 39 120
p3 45 130
p4 37 140
(b) Mapped Data.
ID age trestbps
t1 42 140
t2 43 130
t3 45 130
t4 45 140
35 40 45
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Fig. 2: Dynamic skyline query.
Challenges. Designing a fully secure protocol for skyline queries
over encrypted data presents significant challenges due to the
complex comparisons and computations. Let P denotes a set of
n tuples p1, ...,pn with m attributes and q denotes input query
tuple. In kNN queries, we only need to compute the distances
between each tuple pi and the query tuple q and then choose
the k tuples corresponding to the k smallest distances. In skyline
queries, for each tuple pi, we need to compare it with all other
tuples to check dominance. For each comparison between two
tuples pa and pb, we need to compare all their m attributes and for
comparison of each attribute p[ j], there are three different outputs,
i.e., pa[ j] < (=, >) pb[ j]. Therefore, there are 3
m different outputs
for each comparison between two tuples, based on which we need
to determine if one tuple dominates the other. How to determine
the 2m − 1 cases that satisfy pa dominates pb efficiently while
protecting intermediate results (e.g., whether two attribute values
are the same) is particularly challenging.
Such complex comparisons and computations require more
complex protocol design in order to carry out the computations
on the encrypted data given an encryption scheme with semantic
security (instead of weaker order-preserving or other property-
preserving encryptions). In addition, the extensive intermediate
result means more indirect information about the data can be
potentially revealed (e.g., which tuple dominates which other,
whether there are duplicate tuples or equivalent attribute values)
even if the exact data is protected. This makes it challenging to
design a fully secure and efficient skyline query protocol in which
the cloud should not gain any knowledge about the data including
indirect data patterns.
Contributions. We summarize our contributions as follows.
• We study the secure skyline problem on encrypted data
with semantic security for the first time. We assume the
data is encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem which
provides semantic security and is partially homomorphic.
• We propose a fully secure dominance protocol, which can
be used as a building block for skyline queries as well
as other queries, e.g., reverse skyline queries [11] and k-
skyband queries [35].
• We present two secure skyline query protocols. The first
one, served as a basic and efficient solution, leaks some
indirect data patterns to the cloud server. The second one is
fully secure and ensures that the cloud gains no knowledge
about the data including indirect patterns. The proposed
protocols exploit the partial (additive) homomorphism as
well as novel permutation and perturbation techniques to
ensure the correct result is computed while guaranteeing
privacy. We provide security and complexity analysis of
the proposed protocols.
• Compared with our conference version [31], we present
two new optimizations, data partitioning and lazy merging,
to further reduce the computation load. For the data par-
titioning, we theoretically analyze the optimal number of
partitions given the number of points, the expected number
of output skyline points, the number of decomposed bits,
and the number of dimensions. In addition, we propose
a lazy merging scheme that aims to reduce computation
overhead due to the smaller partition sizes at the later stage
of the partitioning scheme.
• We also provide a complete implementation including both
serial and parallelized versions which can be deployed
in practical settings. We empirically study the efficiency
and scalability of the implementations under different pa-
rameter settings, verifying the feasibility of our proposed
solutions.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 introduces back-
ground definitions as well as our problem setting. The security
subprotocols for general functions that will be used in our secure
skyline protocol are introduced in Section 4. The key subroutine
of secure skyline protocols, secure dominance protocol, is shown
in Section 5. The complete secure skyline protocols are presented
in Section 6. We illustrate two optimizations to further reduce the
computation load in Section 7. We report the experimental results
and findings in Section 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 RelatedWork
Skyline. The skyline computation problem was first studied in
computational geometry field [3], [26] where they focused on
3worst-case time complexity. [24], [30] proposed output-sensitive
algorithms achieving O(nlogk) in worst-case where k is the num-
ber of skyline points which is far less than n in general.
Since the introduction of the skyline operator by Bo¨rzso¨nyi
et al. [5], skyline has been extensively studied in the database
field. Kossmann et al. [25] studied the progressive algorithm for
skyline queries. Different variants of the skyline problem have
been studied (e.g., subspace skyline [8], uncertain skyline [37]
[33], group-based skyline [29], [27], [46], skyline diagram [32]).
Secure query processing on encrypted data. Fully homomor-
phic encryption schemes [15] enable arbitrary computations on
encrypted data. Even though it is shown that [15] we can build
such encryption schemes with polynomial time, they remain far
from practical even with the state of the art implementations [19].
Many techniques (e.g., [18], [40]) have been proposed to
support specific queries or computations on encrypted data with
varying degrees of security guarantee and efficiency (e.g., by
weaker encryptions). We are not aware of any formal work on
secure skyline queries over encrypted data with semantic security.
Bothe et al. [6] and their demo version [7] illustrated an approach
about skyline queries on so-called “encrypted” data without any
formal security guarantee. Another work [9] studied the verifica-
tion of skyline query result returned by an untrusted cloud server.
The closely related work is secure kNN queries [12], [20],
[21], [36], [38], [42], [44], [45] which we discuss in more detail
here. Wong et al. [42] proposed a new encryption scheme called
asymmetric scalar-product-preserving encryption. In their work,
data and query are encrypted using slightly different encryption
schemes and all clients know the private key. Hu et al. [21] pro-
posed a method based on provably secure privacy homomorphism
encryption scheme. However, both schemes are vulnerable to the
chosen-plaintext attacks as illustrated by Yao et al. [44]. Yao et
al. [44] proposed a new method based on secure Voronoi diagram.
Instead of asking the cloud server to retrieve the exact kNN result,
their method retrieve a relevant encrypted partition such that it is
guaranteed to contain the kNN of the query point. Hashem et al.
[20] identified the challenges in preserving user privacy for group
nearest neighbor queries and provided a comprehensive solution
to this problem. Yi et al. [45] proposed solutions for secure kNN
queries based on oblivious transfer paradigm. Recently, Elmehdwi
et al. [12] proposed a secure kNN query protocol on data encrypted
using Paillier cryptosystem that ensures data privacy and query
privacy, as well as low (or no) computation overhead on client
and data owner using two non-colluding cloud servers. Our work
follows this setting and addresses skyline queries.
Other works studied kNN queries in the secure multi-party
computation (SMC) setting [38] (data is distributed between two
parties who want to cooperatively compute the answers without
revealing to each other their private data), or private information
retrieval (PIR) setting [36] (query is private while data is public),
which are different from our settings.
Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC). SMC was first pro-
posed by Yao [43] for two-party setting and then extended by
Goldreich et al. [17] to multi-party setting. SMC refers to the
problem where a set of parties with private inputs wish to compute
some joint function of their inputs. There are techniques such as
garbled circuits [22] and secret sharing [2] that can be used for
SMC. In this paper, all protocols assume a two-party setting, but
different from the traditional SMC setting. Namely, we have party
C1 with encrypted input and party C2 with the private key sk. The
goal is for C1 to obtain an encrypted result of a function on the
input without disclosing the original input to either C1 or C2.
3 Preliminaries and Problem Definitions
In this section, we first illustrate some background knowledge on
skyline computation and dynamic skyline query, and then describe
the security model we use in this paper. For references, a summary
of notations is given in Table 2.
TABLE 2: The summary of notations.
Notation Definition
P dataset of n points/tuples/records
pi[ j] the j
th attribute of pi
q query tuple of client
n number of points in P
m number of dimensions
k number of skyline
l number of bits
K key size
pk/sk public/private key
JaK encrypted vector of the individual bits of a
aˆ binary bit
(a)
(i)
B
the ith bit of binary number a
3.1 Skyline Definitions
Definition 1. (Skyline). Given a dataset P = {p1, ...,pn} in m-
dimensional space. Let pa and pb be two different points in
P, we say pa dominates pb, denoted by pa ≺ pb, if for all j,
pa[ j] ≤ pb[ j], and for at least one j, pa[ j] < pb[ j], where pi[ j]
is the jth dimension of pi and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The skyline points
are those points that are not dominated by any other point in
P.
Definition 2. (Dynamic Skyline Query) [11]. Given a dataset P =
{p1, ...,pn} and a query point q in m-dimensional space. Let pa
and pb be two different points in P, we say pa dynamically
dominates pb with regard to the query point q, denoted by
pa ≺ pb, if for all j, |pa[ j] − q[ j]| ≤ |pb[ j] − q[ j]|, and for at
least one j, |pa[ j]−q[ j]| < |pb[ j]−q[ j]|, where pi[ j] is the j
th
dimension of pi and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. The skyline points are those
points that are not dynamically dominated by any other point
in P.
The traditional skyline definition is a special case of dynamic
skyline query in which the query point is the origin. On the
other hand, dynamic skyline query is equivalent to traditional
skyline computation if we map the points to a new space with
the query point q as the origin and the absolute distances to q as
mapping functions. So the protocols we will present in the paper
also work for traditional skyline computation (without an explicit
query point).
Example 1. Consider Table 1 and Figure 2 as a running example.
Given data points p1 to p4 and query point q, the mapped data
points are computed as ti[ j] = |pi[ j]−q[ j]|+ q[ j]. We see that
t1, t2 are the skyline in the mapped space, and p1, p2 are the
skyline with respect to query q in the original space.
3.2 Skyline Computation
Skyline computation has been extensively studied as we discussed
in Section 2. We illustrate an iterative skyline computation al-
gorithm (Algorithm 1) which will be used as the basis of our
secure skyline protocol. We note that this is not the most efficient
4algorithm to compute skyline for plaintext compared to the divide-
and-conquer algorithm [26]. We construct our secure skyline
protocol based on this algorithm for two reasons: 1) the divide-
and-conquer approach is less suitable if not impossible for a
secure implementation compared to the iterative approach, 2) the
performance of the divide-and-conquer algorithm deteriorate with
the “curse of dimensionality”.
The general idea of Algorithm 1 is to first map the data points
to the new space with the query point as origin (Lines 1-3). Given
the new data points, it computes the sum of all attributes for each
tuple S (ti) (Line 6) and chooses the tuple tmin with smallest S (ti)
as a skyline because no other tuples can dominate it. It then deletes
those tuples dominated by tmin. The algorithm repeats this process
for the remaining tuples until an empty dataset T is reached.
Algorithm 1: Skyline Computation.
input : A dataset P and a query q.
output: Skyline of P.
1 for i = 1 to n do
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 ti[ j] = |pi[ j] − q[ j]|;
4 while the dataset T is not empty do
5 for i = 1 to size of dataset T do
6 S (ti) =
∑m
j=1 ti[ j];
7 choose the tuple tmin with smallest S (ti) as a skyline;
8 add corresponding tuple pmin to the skyline pool;
9 delete those tuples dominated by tmin from T ;
10 delete tuple tmin from T ;
11 return skyline pool;
Example 2. Given the mapped data points t1, ..., t4, we begin by
computing the attribute sum for each tuple as S (t1) = 16,
S (t2) = 7, S (t3) = 9, and S (t4) = 19. We choose the tuple
with smallest S (ti), i.e., t2, as a skyline tuple, delete t2 from
dataset T and add p2 to the skyline pool. We then delete tuples
t3 and t4 from T because they are dominated by t2. Now, there
is only t1 in T . We add p1 to the skyline pool. After deleting
t1 from T , T is empty and the algorithm terminates. p1 and p2
in the skyline pool are returned as the query result.
3.3 Problem Setting
We now describe our problem setting for secure skyline queries
over encrypted data. Consider a data owner (e.g., hospital, CDC)
with a dataset P. Before outsourcing the data, the data owner
encrypts each attribute of each record pi[ j] using a semantically
secure public-key cryptosystem. Fully homomorphic encryption
schemes ensure strong security while enabling arbitrary compu-
tations on the encrypted data. However, the computation cost
is prohibitive in practice. Partially homomorphic encryption is
much more efficient but only provides partially (either additive or
multiplicative) homomorphic properties. Among them, we chose
Paillier [34] mainly due to its additive homomorphic properties
as we employ significantly more additions than multiplications in
our protocol. Furthermore, we can also utilize its homomorphic
multiplication between ciphertext and plaintext. We use pk and sk
to denote the public key and private key, respectively. Data owner
sends Epk(pi[ j]) for i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m to cloud server C1.
Consider an authorized client (e.g., physician) who wishes
to query the skyline tuples corresponding to query tuple q =
(q[1], ...,q[m]). In order to protect the sensitive query tuple, the
Epk(P )Epk(q)
sk
C1 :
C2 :
pk, sk
Epk(P ), Epk(q), pk P, pk, sk
Data owner :Client :
q, pk
partial skyline result
partial skyline result
Fig. 3: Overview of protocol setting.
client uses the same public key pk to encrypt the query tuple and
sends Epk(q) = (Epk(q[1]), ..., Epk(q[m])) to cloud server C1.
Our goal is to enable the cloud server to compute and return
the skyline to the client without learning any information about the
data and the query. In addition to guaranteeing the correctness of
the result and the efficiency of the computation, the computation
should require no or minimal interaction from the client or the
data owner for practicality. To achieve this, we assume there is
an additional non-colluding cloud server, C2, which will hold
the private key sk shared by the data owner and assist with the
computation. This way, the data owner does not need to participate
in any computation. The client also does not need to participate in
any computation except combining the partial result from C1 and
C2 for final result. An overview of the protocol setting is shown in
Figure 3.
3.4 Security Model
Adversary Model. We adopt the semi-honest adversary model in
our study. In any multi-party computation setting, a semi-honest
party correctly follows the protocol specification, yet attempts
to learn additional information by analyzing the transcript of
messages received during the execution. By semi-honest model,
this work implicitly assumes that the two cloud servers do not
collude.
There are two main reasons to adopt the semi-honest adversary
model in our study. First, developing protocols under the semi-
honest setting is an important first step towards constructing
protocols with stronger security guarantees [22]. Using zero-
knowledge proofs [14], these protocols can be transformed into
secure protocols under the malicious model. Second, the semi-
honest model is realistic in current cloud market. C1 and C2 are
assumed to be two cloud servers, which are legitimate, well-known
companies (e.g., Amazon, Google, and Microsoft). A collusion
between them is highly unlikely. Therefore, following the work
done in [12], [28], [47], we also adopt the semi-honest adversary
model for this paper. Please see Security Definition in the Semi-
honest Model and Paillier Cryptosystem in the appendix.
Desired Privacy Properties. Our security goal is to protect the
data and the query as well as the query result from the cloud
servers. We summarize the desired privacy properties below. After
the execution of the entire protocol, the following should be
achieved.
• Data Privacy. Cloud servers C1 and C2 know nothing
about the exact data except the size pattern, the client
knows nothing about the dataset except the skyline query
result.
• Data Pattern Privacy. Cloud servers C1 and C2 know
nothing about the data patterns (indirect data knowledge)
due to intermediate result, e.g., which tuple dominates
which other tuple.
5• Query Privacy. Data owner, cloud servers C1 and C2 know
nothing about the query tuple q.
• Result Privacy. Cloud servers C1 and C2 know nothing
about the query result, e.g., which tuples are in the skyline
result.
4 Basic Security Subprotocols
In this section, we present a set of secure subprotocols for
computing basic functions on encrypted data that will be used to
construct our secure skyline query protocol. All protocols assume
a two-party setting, namely, C1 with encrypted input and C2 with
the private key sk as shown in Figure 3. The goal is for C1 to
obtain an encrypted result of a function on the input without
disclosing the original input to either C1 or C2. We note that this is
different from the traditional two-party secure computation setting
with techniques such as garbled circuits [22] where each party
holds a private input and they wish to compute a function of the
inputs. For each function, we describe the input and output, present
our proposed protocol or provide a reference if existing solutions
are available. Due to limited space, we omit the security proof
which can be derived by the simulation and composition theorem
in a straightforward way. Please see Secure Multiplication (SM),
Secure Bit Decomposition (SBD), and Secure Boolean Operations
in the appendix.
4.1 Secure Minimum and Secure Comparison
Secure minimum protocol and secure comparison protocol have
been extensively studied in cryptography community [1], [13],
[41] and database community [12], [47]. Secure comparison
protocol can be easily adapted to secure minimum protocol, and
vice versa. For example, if we set Epk(out) as the result of secure
comparison Epk(Bool(a ≤ b)) known by cloud server C1 (it will
be Epk(1) when a ≤ b and Epk(0) when a > b), C1 can get
Epk(min(a, b)) by computing Epk(a ∗ out + b ∗ ¬out).
We analyzed the existing protocols and observed that both
secure minimum (SMIN) algorithms [12], [47] from database
community for selecting a minimum have a security weakness,
i.e., C2 can determine whether the two numbers are equal to each
other. We point out the security weakness in the appendix.
Therefore, we adapted the secure minimum/comparison proto-
cols [41] from cryptography community in this paper. The basic
idea of those protocols is that for any two l bit numbers a and
b, the most significant bit (zl) of z = 2
l + a − b indicates the
relationship between a and b, i.e., zl = 0 ⇔ a < b. We list
the secure minimum/comparison protocols we used in this paper
below.
Secure Less Than or Equal (SLEQ). Assume a cloud server C1
with encrypted input Epk(a) and Epk(b), and a cloud server C2 with
the private key sk, where a and b are two numbers not known to
C1 and C2. The goal of the SLEQ protocol is to securely compute
the encrypted boolean output Epk(Bool(a ≤ b)), such that only C1
knows Epk(Bool(a ≤ b)) and no information related to a and b is
revealed to C1 or C2.
Secure Equal (SEQ). Assume a cloud server C1 with encrypted
input Epk(a) and Epk(b), and a cloud server C2 with the private key
sk, where a and b are two numbers not known to C1 and C2. The
goal of the SEQ protocol is to securely compute the encrypted
boolean output Epk(Bool(a == b)), such that only C1 knows
Epk(Bool(a == b)) and no information related to Bool(a == b)
is revealed to C1 or C2.
Secure Less (SLESS). Assume a cloud server C1 with encrypted
input Epk(a) and Epk(b), and a cloud server C2 with the private
key sk, where a and b are two numbers not known to C1 and
C2. The goal of the SLESS protocol is to securely compute the
encrypted boolean output Epk(Bool(a < b)), such that only C1
knows Epk(Bool(a < b)) and no information related to Bool(a <
b) is revealed to C1 or C2. This can be simply implemented by
conjunction from the output of SEQ and SLEQ.
Secure Minimum (SMIN). Assume a cloud server C1 with
encrypted input Epk(a) and Epk(b), and a cloud server C2 with
the private key sk, where a and b are two numbers not known
to both parties. The goal of the SMIN protocol is to securely
compute encrypted minimum value of a and b, Epk(min(a, b)),
such that only C1 knows Epk(min(a, b)) and no information related
to a and b is revealed to C1 or C2. Benefiting from the probabilistic
property of Paillier, the ciphertext of min(a, b), i.e., Epk(min(a, b))
is different from the ciphertext of a, b, i.e., Epk(a), Epk(b).
Therefore, C1 does not know which of a or b is min(a, b). In
general, assume C1 has n encrypted values, the goal of SMIN
protocol is to securely compute encrypted minimum of the n
values.
5 Secure Dominance Protocol
The key to compute skyline is to compute dominance relationship
between two tuples. Assume a cloud server C1 with encrypted
tuples a = (a[1], ..., a[m]), b = (b[1], ..., b[m]) and a cloud server
C2 with the private key sk, where a and b are not known to both
parties. The goal of the secure dominance (SDOM) protocol is
to securely compute Epk(Bool(a ≺ b)) such that only C1 knows
Epk(1) if a ≺ b, otherwise, Epk(0).
Protocol Design. Given any two tuples a = (a[1], ..., a[m]) and
b = (b[1], ...,b[m]), recall the definition of skyline, we say a ≺ b if
for all j, a[ j] ≤ b[ j] and for at least one j, a[ j] < b[ j] (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
If for all j, a[ j] ≤ b[ j], we have either a = b or a ≺ b. We refer
to this case as a  b. The basic idea of secure dominance protocol
is to first determine whether a  b, and then determine whether
a = b.
The detailed protocol is shown in Algorithm 2. For each
attribute, C1 and C2 cooperatively use the secure less than or equal
(SLEQ) protocol to compute Epk(Bool(a[ j] ≤ b[ j])). And then C1
and C2 cooperatively use SAND to compute Φ = δ1∧, ...,∧δm.
If Φ = Epk(1), it means a  b, otherwise, a  b. We note that,
the dominance relationship information Φ is known only to C1 in
ciphertext. Therefore, both C1 and C2 do not know any information
about whether a  b.
Next, we need to determine if a , b. Only if a , b, then
a ≺ b. One naive way is to employ SEQ protocol for each pair of
attribute and then take the conjunction of the output. We propose a
more efficient way which is to check whether S (a) < S (b), where
S (a) is the attribute sum of tuple a. If S (a) < S (b), then it is
impossible that a = b. As the algorithm shows, C1 computes the
sum of all attributes α = Epk(a[1] + ... + a[m]) and β = Epk(b[1] +
... + b[m]) based on the additive homomorphic property. Then
C1 and C2 cooperatively use SLESS protocol to compute σ =
Epk(Bool(α < β)). Finally, C1 and C2 cooperatively use SAND
protocol to compute the final dominance relationship Ψ = σ ∧ Φ
6Algorithm 2: Secure Dominance Protocol.
input : C1 has Epk(a), Epk(b) and C2 has sk.
output: C1 gets Epk(1) if a ≺ b, otherwise, C1 gets Epk(0).
1 C1 and C2:
2 for j = 1 to m do
3 C1 gets δ j = Epk(Bool(a[ j] ≤ b[ j])) by SLEQ;
4 use SAND to compute Φ = δ1 ∧ ...,∧δm;
5 C1:
6 compute α = Epk(a[1])×, ...,×Epk(a[m]);
7 compute β = Epk(b[1])×, ...,×Epk(b[m]);
8 C1 and C2:
9 C1 gets σ = Epk(Bool(α < β)) by employing SLESS;
10 C1 gets Ψ = σ ∧ Φ as the final dominance relationship using
SAND;
which is only known to C1 in ciphertext. Ψ = Epk(1) means a ≺ b,
otherwise, a ⊀ b.
Security Analysis. Based on the composition theorem (Theorem
2), the security of secure dominance protocol relies on the security
of SLEQ, SLESS, and SAND, which have been shown in existing
works.
Complexity Analysis. To determine a  b, Algorithm 2 requires
O(m) encryptions and decryptions. Then to determine if a = b,
Algorithm 2 requires O(1) encryptions and decryptions. Therefore,
our secure dominance protocol requires O(m) encryptions and
decryptions in total.
6 Secure Skyline Protocol
In this section, we first propose a basic secure skyline protocol and
show why such a simple solution is not secure. Then we propose
a fully secure skyline protocol. Both protocols are constructed by
using the security primitives discussed in Section 4 and the secure
dominance protocol in Section 5.
As mentioned in Algorithm 1, given a skyline query q, it is
equivalent to compute the skyline in a transformed space with the
query point q as the origin and the absolute distances to q as
mapping functions. Hence we first show a preprocessing step in
Algorithm 3 which maps the dataset to the new space. Since the
skyline only depends on the order of the attribute values, we use
(pi[ j] − q[ j])
2 which is easier to compute than |pi[ j] − q[ j]| as
the mapping function1. After Algorithm 3, C1 has the encrypted
dataset Epk(P) and Epk(T ), C2 has the private key sk. The goal is to
securely compute the skyline by C1 and C2 without participation
of data owner and the client.
6.1 Basic Protocol
We first illustrate a straw-man protocol which is straightforward
but not fully secure (as shown in Algorithm 4). The idea is to
implement each of the steps in Algorithm 1 using the primitive
secure protocols. C1 first determines the terminal condition, if
there is no tuple exists in dataset Epk(T ), the protocol ends,
otherwise, the protocol proceeds as follows.
Compute minimum attribute sum. C1 first computes the sum of
Epk(ti[ j]) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m, denoted as Epk(S (ti)), for each tuple
ti. Then C1 and C2 uses SMIN protocol such that C1 obtains
Epk(S (tmin)).
1. We use |pi[ j] − q[ j]| in our running example for simplicity.
Algorithm 3: Preprocessing.
input : C1 has Epk(P), C2 has sk, and the client has q.
output: C1 obtains the new encrypted dataset Epk(T ).
1 Client:
2 send (Epk(−q[1]), ..., Epk(−q[m])) to C1;
3 C1:
4 for i = 1 to n do
5 for j = 1 to m do
6 Epk(tempi[ j]) = Epk(pi[ j] − q[ j]) =
Epk(pi[ j]) × Epk(−q[ j]) mod N
2;
7 C1 and C2:
8 use SM protocol to compute Epk(T ) = (Epk(t1), ..., Epk(tn))
only known by C1, where Epk(ti) = (Epk(ti[1]), ..., Epk(ti[m]))
and Epk(ti[ j]) = Epk(tempi[ j]) × Epk(tempi[ j]);
Select the skyline with minimum attribute sum. The challenge
now is we need to select the tuple Epk(tmin) with the smallest
Epk(S (ti)) as a skyline tuple. In order to do this, a naive way is
for C1 to compute Epk(S (ti) − S (tmin)) for all tuples and then send
them to C2. C2 can decrypt them and determine which one is equal
to 0 and return the index to C1. C1 then adds the tuple Epk(pmin)
to skyline pool.
Eliminate dominated tuples. Once the skyline tuple is selected,
C1 and C2 cooperatively use SDOM protocol to determine the
dominance relationship between Epk(tmin) and other tuples. In
order to delete those tuples that are dominated by Epk(tmin), a
naive way is for C1 to send the encrypted dominance output to
C2, who can decrypt it and send back the indexes of the tuples
who are dominated to C2. C1 can delete those tuples dominated
by Epk(tmin) and the tuple Epk(tmin) from Epk(T ). The algorithm
continues until there is no tuples left.
Return skyline results to client. Once C1 has the encrypted
skyline result, it can directly send them to the client if the client has
the private key. However, in our setting, the client does not have
the private key for better security. Lines 25 to 39 in Algorithm
4 illustrate how the client obliviously obtains the final skyline
query result with the help of C1 and C2, at the same time, C1
and C2 know nothing about the final result. Consider the skyline
tuples Epk(p1), ..., Epk(pk) in skyline pool, where k is the number
of skyline. The idea is for C1 to add a random noise ri[ j] to each
pi[ j] in ciphertext and then sends the encrypted randomized values
αi[ j] to C2. C1 also sends the noise ri[ j] to client. At the same
time, C2 decrypts the randomized values αi[ j] and sends the result
r′
i
[ j] to client. Client receives the random noise ri[ j] from C1
and randomized values of the skyline points αi[ j] from C2, and
removes the noise by computing pi[ j] = r
′
i
[ j]− ri[ j] for i = 1, ..., k
and j = 1, ...,m as the final result.
6.2 Fully Secure Skyline Protocol
The basic protocol clearly reveals several information to C1 and
C2 as follows.
• When selecting the skyline tuple with minimum attribute
sum, C1 and C2 know which tuples are skyline points,
which violates our result privacy requirement.
• When eliminating dominated tuples, C1 and C2 know the
dominance relationship among tuples with respect to the
query tuple q, which violates our data pattern privacy
requirement.
7Algorithm 4: Basic Secure Skyline Protocol.
input : C1 has Epk(P), Epk(T ) and C2 has sk.
output: client knows the skyline query result.
1 Compute minimum attribute sum;
2 C1:
3 if there is no tuple in Epk(T ) then
4 break;
5 for i = 1 to n do
6 Epk(S (ti)) = Epk(ti[1]) × ... × Epk(ti[m]) mod N
2;
7 C1 and C2:
8 Epk(S (tmin)) = S MIN(Epk(S (t1)), ..., Epk(S (tn)));
9 Select the skyline with minimum attribute sum;
10 C1:
11 for i = 1 to n do
12 αi = Epk(S (tmin))
N−1 × Epk(S (ti)) mod N
2;
13 α′
i
= α
ri
i
mod N2, where ri ∈ Z
+
N
;
14 send α′ to C2;
15 C2:
16 decrypt α′ and tell C1 which one equals to 0;
17 C1:
18 add the corresponding Epk(pmin) to the skyline pool;
19 Eliminate dominated tuples;
20 C1 and C2:
21 use SDOM protocol to determine the dominance relationship
between Epk(tmin) and other tuples;
22 delete those tuples dominated by Epk(tmin) and Epk(tmin);
23 GOTO Line 1;
24 Return skyline results to client;
25 C1:
26 for i = 1 to k do
27 for j = 1 to m do
28 αi[ j] = Epk(pi[ j]) × Epk(ri[ j]) mod N
2, where
ri[ j] ∈ Z
+
N
;
29 send αi[ j] to C2 and ri[ j] to client for all
i = 1, ..., k; j = 1, ...,m;
30 C2:
31 for i = 1 to k do
32 for j = 1 to m do
33 ri[ j]
′ = Dsk(αi[ j]);
34 send ri[ j]
′ to client;
35 Client:
36 receive ri[ j] from C1 and ri[ j]
′ from C2;
37 for i = 1 to k do
38 for j = 1 to m do
39 pi[ j] = ri[ j]
′ − ri[ j];
To address these leakage, we propose a fully secure protocol
in Algorithm 5. The step to compute minimum attribute sum and
return the results to the client are the same as the basic protocol.
We focus on the following steps that are designed to address the
disclosures of the basic protocol.
Select skyline with minimum attribute sum. Once C1 obtains
the encrypted minimum attribute sum Epk(S (tmin)), the challenge
is how to select the tuple Epk(tmin) with the minimum sum
Epk(S (tmin)) as a skyline tuple such that C1 and C2 know nothing
about which tuple is selected. We present a protocol as shown in
Algorithm 6.
We first need to determine which S (ti) is equal to S (tmin).
Note that this can not be achieved by the SMIN protocol which
only selects the minimum value. Here we propose an efficient
way, exploiting the fact that it is okay for C2 to know there is one
Algorithm 5: Fully Secure Skyline Protocol.
input : C1 has Epk(P), Epk(T ) and C2 has sk.
output: C1 knows the encrypted skyline Epk(psky).
1 Order preserving perturbation;
2 C1:
3 for i = 1 to n do
4 Epk(S (ti)) = Epk(ti[1]) × ... × Epk(ti[m]) mod N
2;
5 C1 and C2:
6 for i = 1 to n do
7 JEpk(S (ti))K = S BD(Epk(S (ti)));
8 C1:
9 for i = 1 to n do
10 JEpk(S (ti))K = 〈Epk((S (ti))
(1)
B
), ..., Epk((S (ti))
(l)
B
),
Epk((S (ti))
(l+1)
B
), ..., Epk((S (ti))
(l+⌈log n⌉)
B
)〉, where
(S (ti))
(l+1)
B
, ..., (S (ti))
(l+⌈log n⌉)
B
is the binary representation
of an exclusive vale of [0, n − 1];
11 Epk(S (ti)) =
∏l
γ=1 Epk((S (ti))
(γ)
B
)2
l−γ
mod N2;
12 C1 and C2:
13 Epk(S (tmin)) = S MIN(Epk(S (t1)), ..., Epk(S (tn));
14 C1:
15 λ = (Epk(S (tmin)) × Epk(MAX)
−1)r mod N2, where ri ∈ Z
+
N
;
16 send λ to C2;
17 C2:
18 if Dsk(λ) = 0 then
19 break;
20 Select skyline with minimum attribute sum;
21 (Epk(psky), Epk(tsky)) =FindOneSkyline
(Epk(P), Epk(T ), Epk(S (ti)), Epk(S (tmin))) (Algorithm 6);
22 Eliminate dominated tuples;
23 C1 and C2:
24 for i = 1 to n do
25 for γ = 1 to l do
26 Epk((S (ti))
(γ)
B
) = S OR(Vi, Epk((S (ti))
(γ)
B
));
27 C1:
28 for i = 1 to n do
29 Epk(S (ti)) =
∏l
γ=1 Epk((S (ti))
(γ)
B
)2
l−γ
mod N2;
30 C1 and C2:
31 for i = 1 to n do
32 Vi = S DOM(Epk(tsky), Epk(ti));
33 Lines 23-32;
34 GOTO Line 1;
equal case (since we are selecting one skyline tuple) as long as
it does not know which one. C1 first computes α
′
i
= Epk((S (ti) −
S (tmin)) × ri), and then sends a permuted list β = pi(α
′) to C2
based on a random permutation sequence pi. The permutation hides
which sum is equal to the minimum from C2 while the uniformly
random noise ri masks the difference between each sum and the
minimum sum. Note that α′
i
is uniformly random in Z+
N
except
when S (ti)−S (tmin) = 0, in which case α
′
i
= 0. C1 decrypts βi, if it
is 0, it means tuple i has smallest Epk(S (ti)). Therefore, C2 sends
Epk(1) to C1, otherwise, sends Epk(0).
After receiving the encrypted permuted bit vector U as the
equality result, C1 applies a reverse permutation, and obtains an
encrypted bit vector V, where one tuple has bit 1 suggesting it
has the minimum sum. In order to obtain the attribute values of
this tuple, C1 and C2 employ SM protocol to compute encrypted
product of the bit vector and the attribute values, Epk(ti[ j]
′) and
Epk(pi[ j]
′). Since all other tuples except the one with the minimum
sum will be 0, we can sum all Epk(ti[ j]
′) and Epk(pi[ j]
′) on each
8attribute and C1 can obtain the attribute values corresponding to
the skyline tuple.
Algorithm 6: Find One Skyline.
input : C1 has encrypted dataset Epk(P), Epk(T ), Epk(S (ti)),
and Epk(S (tmin)), C2 has private key sk.
output: C1 knows one encrypted skyline Epk(psky) and
Epk(tsky).
1 C1:
2 for i = 1 to n do
3 αi = Epk(S (tmin))
N−1 × Epk(S (ti)) mod N
2;
4 α′
i
= α
ri
i
mod N2, where ri ∈ Z
+
N
;
5 send β = pi(α′) to C2;
6 C2:
7 receive β from C1;
8 for i = 1 to n do
9 β′i = Dsk(βi);
10 if β′
i
= 0 then
11 Ui = Epk(1);
12 else
13 Ui = Epk(0);
14 send U to C1;
15 C1:
16 receive U from C2;
17 V = pi−1(U);
18 for i = 1 to n do
19 for j = 1 to m do
20 Epk(ti[ j]
′) = S M(Vi, Epk(ti[ j]));
21 Epk(pi[ j]
′) = S M(Vi, Epk(pi[ j]));
22 for j = 1 to m do
23 Epk(t[ j]
′) =
∏n
i=1 Epk(ti[ j]
′) mod N2;
24 Epk(p[ j]
′) =
∏n
i=1 Epk(pi[ j]
′) mod N2;
25 add Epk(psky) = 〈Epk(p[1]
′), ..., Epk(p[m]
′)〉 to skyline pool;
26 use Epk(tsky) = 〈Epk(t[1]
′), ..., Epk(t[m]
′)〉 to compare with
other Epk(ti);
Order preserving perturbation. We can show that Algorithm 6
is secure and correctly selects the skyline tuple if there is only one
minimum. A potential issue is that multiple tuples may have the
same minimum sum. If this happens, not only is this information
revealed to C2, but also the skyline tuple cannot be selected
(computed) correctly, since the bit vector contains more than one
1 bit. To address this, we employ order-preserving perturbation
which adds a set of mutually different bit sequence to a set of
values such that: 1) if the original values are equal to each other,
the perturbed values are guaranteed not equal to each other, and
2) if the original values are not equal to each other, their order
is preserved. The perturbed values are then used as the input for
Algorithm 6.
Concretely, given n numbers in their binary representations,
we add a ⌈logn⌉-bit sequence to the end of each Epk(S (ti)), each
represents a unique bit sequence in the range of [0, n − 1]. This
way, the perturbed values are guaranteed to be different from each
other while their order is preserved since the added bits are the
least significant bits. Line 10 of Algorithm 5 shows this step. We
note that we can multiply each sum Epk(S (ti)) by n and uniquely
add a value from [0, n − 1] to each Epk(S (ti)), hence guarantee
they are not equal to each other. This will be more efficient than
adding a bit sequence, however, since we will need to perform the
bit decomposition later in the protocol to allow bit operators, we
run decomposition by the SBD protocol for l bits in the beginning
of the protocol rather than l + ⌈log n⌉ bits later.
Eliminate dominated tuples. Once the skyline tuple is selected,
it can be added to the skyline pool and then used to eliminate
dominated tuples. In order to do this, C1 and C2 cooperatively use
SDOM protocol to determine the dominance relationship between
Epk(tmin) and other tuples. The challenge is then how to eliminate
the dominated tuples without C1 and C2 knowing which tuples
are being dominated and eliminated. Our idea is that instead of
eliminating the dominated tuples, we “flag” them by securely
setting their attribute values to the maximum domain value. This
way, they will not be selected as skyline tuples in the remaining
iterations. Concretely, we can set the binary representation of
their attribute sum to all 1s so that it represents the domain
maximum. Since we added ⌈log n⌉ bits to JEpk(S (ti))K, the new
JEpk(S (ti))K has l + ⌈log n⌉ bits. Therefore, the maximum value
MAX = 2l+⌈log n⌉ − 1. To obliviously set the attributes of only
dominated tuples to MAX, based on the encrypted dominance
output Vi of the dominance protocol, C1 and C2 cooperatively
employ SOR of the dominance boolean output and the bits of the
S (ti). This way, if the tuple is dominated, it will be set to MAX.
Otherwise, it will remain the same. If Epk(S (tmin)) = Epk(MAX), it
means all the tuples are processed, i.e., flagged either as a skyline
or a dominated tuple, the protocol ends.
Example 3. We illustrate the entire protocol through the running
example shown in Table 3. Please note that all column values
are in encrypted form except columns pi and β′. Given the
mapped data points ti, C1 first computes the attribute sum
Epk(S (ti)) shown in the third column. We set l = 5, C1 gets
the binary representation of the attribute sum JEpk(S (ti))K.
Because n = 4, C1 obliviously adds the order-preserving
perturbation ⌈log 4⌉ = 2 bits to the end of JEpk(S (ti))K respec-
tively to get the new Epk(S (ti)) (shown in the sixth column).
Then C1 gets Epk(S (tmin)) = Epk(30) by employing SMIN.
The protocol then turns to the subroutine Algorithm 6 to
select the first skyline based on the minimum attribute sum.
C1 computes αi = Epk(S (ti) − S (tmin)). Assume the random
noise vector r = 〈3, 9, 31, 2〉 and the permutation sequence
pi = 〈2, 1, 4, 3〉, C1 sends the encrypted permuted and random-
ized difference vector β to C2. After decrypting β, C2 gets
β′ and then sends U to C1. C1 computes V by applying a
reverse permutation. By employing SM with V, C1 computes
(Epk(ti[1]
′), Epk(ti[2]
′)) and (Epk(pi[1]
′), Epk(pi[2]
′)). After
summing all column values, C1 adds Epk(psky) = (Epk(39),
Epk(120)) to skyline pool and uses Epk(tsky) = (Epk(2), Epk(5))
to eliminate dominated tuples.
The protocol now turns back to the main routine in Algorithm
5 to eliminate dominated tuples. C1 and C2 use SOR with V to
make Epk(S (tmin)) = Epk(127) and Epk(S (ti)) = Epk(S (ti)) for
i , min. Now, only Epk(S (tmin)) = Epk(S (t2)) has changed to
Epk(127) which is “flagged” as MAX. We emphasize that C1
does not know this value has changed because the ciphertext
of all tuples has changed. Next, C1 and C2 find the dominance
relationship between Epk(tsky) and Epk(ti) by SDOM protocol.
C1 obtains the dominance vector V. Using same method,
C1 flags Epk(S (t3)) and Epk(S (t4)) to Epk(127). The protocol
continues until all are set to MAX.
Security Analysis. Based on Theorem 1, the protocol is secure
if the subprotocols are secure and the intermediate results are
9TABLE 3: Example of Algorithm 5.
C1: C2: C1:
ti (ti[1], ti[2]) S (ti) JS (ti)K pert. S (ti) S (ti) − S (tmin) r pi β
′ U V (ti[1]
′ , ti[2]
′) (pi[1]
′ , pi[2]
′ ) S (ti) V S (ti)
t1 (1, 15) 16 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 1, 1 67 67 − 30 3 2 0 1 0 (0, 0) (0, 0) 67 0 67
t2 (2, 5) 7 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 1, 0 30 30 − 30 9 1 111 0 1 (2, 5) (39, 120) 127 0 127
t3 (4, 5) 9 0, 1, 0, 0, 1 0, 1 37 37 − 30 31 4 92 0 0 (0, 0) (0, 0) 37 1 127
t4 (4, 15) 19 1, 0, 0, 1, 1 0, 0 76 76 − 30 2 3 217 0 0 (0, 0) (0, 0) 76 1 127
random or pseudo-random. We focus on the intermediate result
here. From C1’s view, the intermediate result includes U. Because
U is ciphertext and C1 does not have the secret key, C1 can
simulate U based on its input and output. From C2’s view, the
intermediate result includes β. β contains one Epk(0) and m − 1
ciphertext of any positive value. After the permutation pi of C1, C2
cannot determine where is the Epk(0). Therefore, C2 can simulate
β based on its input and output. Hence the protocol is secure.
Computational Complexity Analysis. The subroutine Algorithm
6 requires O(n) decryptions in Line 9, O(nm) encryptions and
decryptions in Lines 20 and 21. Thus, Algorithm 6 requires O(nm)
encryptions and decryptions in all. In Algorithm 5, Line 7 requires
O(nl) encryptions and decryptions. Line 10 requires O(n⌈log n⌉)
encryptions. Line 12 requires O((l + ⌈log n⌉)n) encryptions and
decryptions. Line 26 requires O(l + ⌈log n⌉) encryptions and de-
cryptions. Line 32 requires O(nm) encryptions and decryptions.
Thus, this part requires O((l + ⌈log n⌉)n + nm) encryptions and
decryptions. Because this part runs k times, the fully secure
skyline protocol requires O(k(l+ ⌈log n⌉)n+ knm) encryptions and
decryptions in total.
7 Performance Analysis and Optimizations
In this section, we illustrate two optimizations to further reduce the
computation load. We first show a data partitioning optimization
in Subsection 7.1, and then show a lazy merging optimization in
Subsection 7.2.
7.1 Optimization of Data Partitioning
As shown in the previous section, the overall run time complexity
depends on the number of points (n), the number of skyline points
(k), the number of decomposed bits (l) which is determined by
the domain of the attribute values, and the number of dimensions
(m). A straightforward way to enhance the performance is to
partition the input dataset into subdatasets and then we can use a
divide-and-conquer approach to avoid unnecessary computations.
Furthermore, the partitioning also allows effective parallelism.
The basic idea of data partitioning is to divide the dataset into a
set of initial partitions, compute the skyline in each partition, and
then continuously merge the skyline result of the partitions into
new partitions and compute their skyline, until all partitions are
merged into the final result. This can be implemented with either
a single thread (sequentially) or multiple threads (in parallel).
We describe our data partitioning scheme in Algorithm 7. Given
an input dataset, the number of partitions s is specified as one
parameter. We will show how to calculate the optimal number of
partitions in Subsection 7.1.1. We first divide the input data into
s partitions and compute the skyline in each partition in Line 1,
and then set the state of all partitions as uncomputed in Line 2.
In Line 7, the algorithm continues with uncomputed partitions or
idle threads. In Line 8, if there are some uncomputed partitions
and there are some idle threads, we assign one uncomputed
partition to each idle thread in Line 9. In Line 11, if there
is no uncomputed partition (np == 0), all computed partitions
are merged (num == 0), and there is only one working thread
(nit == nt −1), that means all partitions are computed and merged,
the algorithm finishes. Otherwise, we wait until at least one thread
finishes and set the state of computed partition which now only
contains skylines in that partition as unmerged in Lines 13-14.
In Line 15, if there are some computed and unmerged partitions,
we merge each two into one new partition and set the state as
uncomputed in Lines 16-17.
Algorithm 7: Parallel implementation via data partitioning.
input : A dataset P of n points in m dimensions.
output: Skyline of P.
1 divide n points into s partitions and compute the skyline points
in each partition;
2 set the state of all partitions as uncomputed;
3 np ← number of uncomputed partitions;
4 nt ← number of threads;
5 nit ← number of idle threads;
6 num ← number of computed and unmerged results;
7 while np > 0 or nit > 0 do
8 if np > 0 and nit > 0 then
9 assign one uncomputed partition to each idle thread;
10 else
11 if np == 0 and nit == nt − 1 and num == 0 then
12 break;
13 wait until at least one thread finishes;
14 set the state of computed partition as unmerged;
15 if num > 1 then
16 merge each two into one new partition;
17 set new partition state as uncomputed;
7.1.1 Discovery of Optimal Number of Partitions
In this subsection, we show how to calculate the optimal number
of partitions for minimizing the total computation load given an
independent and identically distributed random dataset. We first
show the theorem of the expected number of skyline points as
follows.
Theorem 1. (Number of Skyline Points) [4]. Given an indepen-
dent and identically distributed random dataset of n points in
m dimensional space, the expected number of skyline points is
O(lnm−1 n).
In the computational complexity analysis of fully secure
skyline protocol, the time complexity is O(kn(l + m + ⌈log n⌉)).
According to Theorem 1, the expected output size of input data
with size n
s
in m dimensional space is lnm−1( n
s
). Therefore, in
this step, the computation load required for each partition is
lnm−1( n
s
)× n
s
× (log( n
s
)+m+ l). Since we have s partitions, the total
computation load required is s × lnm−1( n
s
) × n
s
× (log( n
s
) +m+ l) =
n × lnm−1( n
s
) × (log( n
s
) + m + l). This is the initial layer of the
computation, which we refer to layer0. We use 0 because the
following layers have a slightly different formula.
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Before we proceed, we denote the number of layers excluding
layer0 as nlayer. For each layer i, we denote the number of partitions
that needs to be computed as np,i, the size of a single input partition
as sizein,i, the output size of a single partition as sizeout,i, and
the amount of computation load as Wlayeri . A visual graph about
the layer structure is shown in Figure 4. In the ideal case, we
have s = 2h partitions, where h is an integer. For each layer, we
reduce the number of partitions by merging two partitions to form
a new partition which contains skyline points of those two merged
partitions. After h layers’ merging, we obtain only one partition
which is the final skyline result.
Number of Partitions and Layers. To simplify the analysis,
we assume the merging of two partitions happens at the same
layer (although mergings from different layers may happen at the
same time). As shown in Figure 4, the datasets for layeri (i > 1)
comes from the merging of two computed partitions from layeri−1.
Therefore, in layeri, the number of partitions (np,i) is
s
2i
given
the number of partitions in layer1 is
s
2
. Meanwhile, layer0 has
s partitions, layer1 has
s
2
partitions, and the last layer has one
partition, so the number of layers excluding layer0 (nlayer) is log s.
partition1 partition2 partition3 partition4 partitions−1 partitions
layer1
layer0
n=s n=s n=s n=s n=s n=s
lnm−1(n=s) lnm−1(n=s) lnm−1(n=s) lnm−1(n=s) lnm−1(n=s) lnm−1(n=s)
2lnm−1(n=s) 2lnm−1(n=s) 2lnm−1(n=s)
lnm−1(2n=s) lnm−1(2n=s) lnm−1(2n=s)
layeri
layeri−1
lnm−1(2i−1n=s) lnm−1(2i−1n=s)
2lnm−1(2i−1n=s) 2lnm−1(2i−1n=s)
2lnm−1(2i−2n=s) 2lnm−1(2i−2n=s)
lnm−1(2in=s) lnm−1(2in=s)
layerlog(s)2lnm−1(2log(s)−1n=s)
lnm−1(2log(s)n=s) = lnm−1(n)
partition1 partition2 partitions=2
partition1
partition1
partition1
partitions=2i−1
parititions=2i
final result
interResult
interResult
interResult
interResult
Fig. 4: Layer structure (interResult is short for intermediate result).
Output Size. A partition in layeri is merged from 2
i partitions
in layer0. Therefore, the expected output size of one partition
at layeri corresponds to the expected output size of 2
i partitions
in layer0. That is, in layeri, the expected output size of a single
partition (sizeout,i) is ln
m−1( 2
in
s
).
Input Size. In layeri, the size of each input partition (sizein,i) is
twice of the single partition output size from the last layer because
it is the merging of two outputs from the last layer. In other words,
sizein,i = 2× sizeout,i−1 = 2×ln
m−1( 2
i−1n
s
). For example, the expected
single partition output size of layer0 is ln
m−1( n
s
) and the expected
size of each input partition in layer1 is 2 × ln
m−1( n
s
).
Computation Load. With np,i, sizein,i, and sizeout,i, we can obtain
the general formula for computation load of layeri (i , 0) as Wlayeri
= np,i × sizeout,i × sizein,i × (m + log(sizein,i)) according to the time
complexity of our fully secure skyline protocol. And since we have
nlayer layers, the overall computation load is calculated as follows.
Wall =Wlayer0 +
nlayer∑
1
Wlayeri
=Wlayer0 +
nlayer∑
1
np,i × sizeout,i × sizein,i × (m + log(sizein,i))
=n × lnm−1(
n
s
) × (log
n
s
+ m + l) +
log s∑
i=1
s
2i
×
lnm−1(
2in
s
) × 2lnm−1(
2i−1n
s
) × (log(2lnm−1(
2i−1n
s
)) + m + l)
Optimal Number of Partitions. Without loss of generality, from
now on, we assume n = 2u and s = 2v, where u, v ∈ Z+ and
1 ≤ v < u. To find out the optimal number of partitions, our goal
is to minimize Wall against s or v. Because n = 2
u and s = 2v, we
have the computation load W(v) corresponding to the number of
partition s = 2v as follows.
W(v) =2u × (u − v)m−1 × lnm−1 2 × (u − v + m + l)+
v∑
i=1
2v−i+1 × (i + u − v)m−1 × (i − 1 + u − v)m−1 × ln2m−2 2
× (log(2 × (i − 1 + u − v)m−1 lnm−1 2) + m + l)
We denote the part after
∑
as WIv,i. Notice that WIv,i =
WIv+1,i+1, we have
W(v + 1) − W(v) =Wlayer0,v+1 − Wlayer0,v +
v+1∑
i=1
WIv+1,i −
v∑
i=1
WIv,i
=Wlayer0,v+1 − Wlayer0,v +WIv+1,1
Notice that the minimal value of W lies at the position where
W(v+1)−W(v) changes from negative to positive. Observe that in
our setting, all variables can only be positive integer, which means
we need to find out the integer v such that f (v) = W(v+ 1)−W(v)
changes from negative to positive. By letting x = u − v, we have
f (x) =WIv+1,1 +Wlayer0,v+1 − Wlayer0,v
=2v+1 × (x)m−1 × (x − 1)m−1 × ln2m−2 2
× (log(2 × (x − 1)m−1 lnm−1 2) + m + l)
+ 2u × (x − 1)m−1 × lnm−1 2 × (x − 1 + m + l)
− 2u × xm−1 × lnm−1 2 × (x + m + l)
=2u lnm−1 2 × (21−x × xm−1 × (x − 1)m−1 × lnm−1 2
× (log(2 × (x − 1)m−1 lnm−1 2) + m + l)
+ ((x − 1)m−1 × (x − 1 + m + l) − xm−1 × (x + m + l)))
To obtain the minimal value of f (x), we can ignore the
preceding 2u lnm−1 2 which is always positive. Then we can easily
solve the problem to find out x where f (x) changes from positive
to negative given m and l.
For example, we set l = 20 in our experiments, if m = 2, then
the minimal value of W(v) is obtained at x = 1, i.e., u − v = 1.
This actually corresponds to the case where each initial partition
has two data points. If m = 3, we have x = 6, i.e., u − v = 6. That
is, for three dimensional datasets, the optimal number of partitions
is 2u−6 and each partition has 26 points.
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7.2 Optimization of Lazy Merging
In this subsection, we show another optimization with lazy merg-
ing.
Lazy Merging. In the hierarchical divide-and-conquer approach
proposed in the last subsection, results from any two computed
partitions are merged immediately as a new partition for com-
puting skyline points. However, immediate merging might not be
optimal in the later stage of the program because it requires 1)
more merging overhead and 2) more unnecessary computations. In
the later stage of the program, there are only a few points in each
partition. At this time, merging overhead is high compared to the
computation time. Therefore, we can employ lazy merging which
incurs less merging overhead. Furthermore, in the later stage of
the program, those remaining points are likely to follow an anti-
correlated distribution as they are skyline points of a partition
at a previous layer. For anti-correlated dataset, data partitioning
will incur more unnecessary computations. Consider an extreme
example, if all the remaining points are the final skyline points, all
the computations in each partition are unnecessary. Therefore, we
can employ lazy merging to avoid those unnecessary computations
and delay the merging operation to a later time when more
computed results are ready.
Merging Timing. With lazy merging, we can reduce running time
if and only if the timing for lazy merging is perfect. Merging too
early (immediate merging) or merging too late does not provide
enough benefit or even jeopardizes the performance. As shown
in the last subsection, for a given dataset, we can calculate the
optimal number of partitions, which is related to the dataset size.
For example, given l = 20 and m = 3, we have the number of
optimal partitions as n
26
, which effectively states that the optimal
size of each partition should be 26 = 64 in the initial layer.
Therefore, in our algorithm, we heuristically wait until the size
of merged partitions reach 64 before sending it for computation
in the previous example. That is, there are at least 64 points in
each partition (excluding the final partition which contains the
final skyline points) to compute the skyline points.
Security Analysis. The cloud servers can tell if the subsets are
skew or uniformly distributed in the extreme case when the
distribution of entire dataset is different from the distribution
of subsets based on the different number of returned skyline
points from each partition. However, the probability is very low
because we randomly partition the dataset, and the distribution of
subsets should be very similar to the distribution of entire dataset.
Moreover, this attack can be easily fixed by returning all the tuples
in each iteration. That is, cloud servers C1 and C2 return all skyline
tuples with true values and non-skyline tuples with MAX values.
In this way, the cloud servers cannot know the skyline distribution
of subsets, thus, the cloud servers cannot get any new information
from the partitions.
8 Experiments
In this section, we describe our experimental setup and optimized
parallel system design. For comparison purposes, we have imple-
mented both protocols: the Basic Secure Skyline Protocol (BSSP)
in Section 6.1, and the Fully Secure Skyline Protocol (FSSP)
in Section 6.2. Since there is no existing solution for secure
skyline computation, we use the basic approach as a baseline
which is efficient but leaks some indirect data patterns to the cloud
server. We have also designed a parallel framework for effective
reducing computation time together with the two optimizations,
data partitioning and lazy merging.
8.1 Experiment Setup
We implemented all algorithms in C with all multithreading using
POSIX threads and all communication using sockets. We ran
single-machine-experiments on a machine with Intel Core i7-
6700K 4.0GHz running Ubuntu 16.04. The distributed version
was tested on a cluster of 64 machines with Intel Core i7-2600
3.40GHz running CentOS 6, which we will provide more details
in the next section. In our experiment setup, both C1 and C2 were
running on the same machine. The reported computation time is
the total computation time of the C1 and C2.
Datasets. We used both synthetic datasets and a real NBA dataset
in our experiments. To study the scalability of our methods,
we generated independent (INDE), correlated (CORR), and anti-
correlated (ANTI) datasets following the seminal work [5]. We
also built a dataset that contains 2384 NBA players who are league
leaders of playoffs2. Each player has five attributes that measure
the player’s performance: Points (PTS), Rebounds (REB), Assists
(AST), Steals (STL), and Blocks (BLK).
Data Partitioning. This procedure can be done either using single
thread or multiple threads. We conducted single thread experiment
for verifying the optimal number of partitions. And we refer to
multithreading implementation as local parallelism. The algorithm
is shown in Algorithm 7.
To further demonstrate the scalability of our algorithm, we
also implemented a distributed version, which employs a manager-
worker model. The manager distributes partitions to workers, the
workers compute the skyline points in any given dataset and
return the results to the manager, which works similarly as the
local parallelism. The only difference is that the manager could
implement sophisticated load balancing algorithm to fully utilize
the computation resources. The overall data partitioning scheme
is very similar to the existing MapReduce approach. However, we
didn’t employ existing MapReduce framework because existing
crypto library in Java does not satisfy our requirements.
Lazy Merging. The lazy merging delays the merging operation
until there are enough results to form a partition with optimal size,
which is detailed shown in Section 7.1.1. All experiments using
optimizations are conducted using 10 different independent and
identically distributed random datasets of size 512 and dimension
3 with three repeated runs for each dataset.
8.2 Impact of Parameters
In this subsection, we evaluate our protocols by varying the
number of tuples (n), the number of dimensions (m), and the key
size (K) on datasets of various distributions.
Impact of number of tuples n. Figures 6(a)(b)(c)(d) show the
time cost of different n on CORR, INDE, ANTI, and NBA
datasets, respectively. We observe that for all datasets, the time
cost increases approximately linearly with the number of tuples
n, which is consistent with our complexity analysis. While BSSP
is very efficient, FSSP does incur more computational overhead
2. The data was extracted from http://stats.nba.com/leaders /all-
time/?ls=iref:nba:gnav on 04/15/2015
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for full security. Comparing different datasets, the time cost is in
slightly increasing order for CORR, INDE, and ANTI, due to the
increasing number of skyline points of the datasets. The time for
NBA dataset is low due to its small number of tuples.
Impact of number of dimensions m. Figures 7(a)(b)(c)(d) show
the time cost of different m on CORR, INDE, ANTI, and NBA
datasets, respectively. For all datasets, the time cost increases
approximately linearly with the number of dimensions m. FSSP
also shows more computational overhead than BSSP. The different
datasets show a similar comparison as in Figure 6. The time for
NBA dataset is lower than the CORR dataset which suggests that
the NBA data is strongly correlated.
Impact of encryption key size K. Figures 8(a)(b)(c)(d) show the
time cost with different key size used in the Paillier cryptosystem
on CORR, INDE, ANTI, and NBA datasets, respectively. A
stronger security indeed comes at the price of computation over-
head, i.e., the time cost increases significantly, almost exponential,
when K grows.
Communication overhead. We also measured the overall time
which includes computation time reported earlier and the commu-
nication time between the two server processes. Figure 5 shows
the computation and communication time of different n on INDE
dataset of FSSP. We observe that computation time only takes
about one third of the total time in this setting.
Fig. 5: Computation and communication time cost of different n
(m=2, K=512).
8.3 Effect of Optimizations
In this subsection, we evaluate the efficiency of our proposed two
optimizations, data partitioning and lazy merging.
Data Partitioning. Figure 9 shows the relationship between
theoretical computation load and real computation time. The
theoretical computation load has an optimal value at the partition
29−6 = 8, which indicates dividing the original dataset into 8
partitions will give the smallest amount of computation load.
Using ten datasets and three repeated runs for each dataset, we
obtained the real computation time, which perfectly matches the
theoretical computation load at the region with small number
of partitions. With large number of partitions, the experimental
results deviate from theoretical derivations. The reason for the
deviation is that when the number of points in each partition is too
small for large number of partitions, the number of skyline points
in each partition violates our assumption of data distribution.
For example, it is hard to say a dataset with only five points
is an independent and identically distributed random dataset.
Therefore, computation time for each partition does not follow
our derivation. Furthermore, the large number of partitions will
incur more merging overhead.
Lazy Merging. As yet another optimization, lazy merging plays
an important role especially when the number of partitions is
large. In Figure 10, we show the computation time with and
without lazy merging, respectively. It can be seen that overall with
lazy merging, the run time can be effectively reduced. The larger
number of partitions, the larger number of time difference, which
is reasonable because the larger number of partitions, the larger
number of merging operations and more rounds of computation.
We can also see that for one partition (no partition) and two
partitions, there is no time reduction, the reasons are that there
is no merging operation need for one partition and there is no lazy
merging operation for two partitions.
To summarize, both data partitioning and lazy merging have
been proven effective and can significantly reduce the computation
time even using single thread.
8.4 Effect of Parallelism
In this subsection, we demonstrate the speedup of our protocol
by using multithreading (local parallelism) on independent and
identically distributed random datasets with 512 points and dis-
tributed computing with 64 commercial desktops (global paral-
lelism) on independent and identically distributed random datasets
with 65536 points.
As shown in Figure 11, if we use one machine with up to
4 threads, the protocol almost shows a linear speedup. As the
number of threads doubles, the computation time reduces to half.
However, as we further increase the number of threads, we only
see sub-linear speedup. We believe this is due to the small size of
the dataset. In distributed computation experiments, we employed
4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128 threads, respectively. It is clear that at the
beginning the protocol shows a linear speedup. While the number
of threads reaches 64, it switches to sub-linear speedup again due
to the small size of dataset. In both local and global parallelism, we
observe that the difference between with lazy merging and without
lazy merging is too small to be observed. In other words, when we
have enough computation power, lazy merging provides limited
improvement, which is opposite to what we see in single-thread
experiment.
9 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a fully secure skyline protocol on
encrypted data using two non-colluding cloud servers under the
semi-honest model. It ensures semantic security in that the cloud
servers knows nothing about the data including indirect data
patterns, query, as well as the query result. In addition, the client
and data owner do not need to participate in the computation.
We also presented a secure dominance protocol which can be
used by skyline queries as well as other queries. Furthermore,
we demonstrated two optimizations, data partitioning and lazy
merging, to further reduce the computation load. Finally, we
presented our implementation of the protocol and demonstrated
the feasibility and efficiency of the solution. As for future work,
we plan to optimize the communication time complexity to further
improve the performance of the protocol.
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Appendix A
Basic Security Subprotocols
Secure Multiplication (SM). Assume a cloud server C1 with
encrypted input Epk(a) and Epk(b), and a cloud server C2 with the
private key sk, where a, b are two numbers not known to C1 and
C2. The Secure Multiplication (SM) protocol [12] (based on the
additively homomorphic property of Paillier) securely computes
encrypted result of multiplication of a, b, Epk(a × b), such that
only C1 knows Epk(a × b), and no information related to a, b is
revealed to C1 or C2.
Secure Bit Decomposition (SBD). Assume a cloud server C1 with
encrypted input Epk(a) and a cloud server C2 with the private key
sk, where a is a number not known to C1 and C2. The Secure Bit
Decomposition (SBD) protocol [39] securely computes encrypted
individual bits of the binary representation of a, denoted as JaK =
〈Epk((a)
(1)
B
), ..., Epk((a)
(l)
B
)〉, where l is the number of bits, (a)
(1)
B
and
(a)
(l)
B
denote the most and least significant bits of a, respectively.
At the end of the protocol, the output JaK is known only to C1 and
no information related to a is revealed to C1 or C2.
A.1 Secure Boolean Operations
Secure OR (SOR). Assume a cloud sever C1 with encrypted input
Epk(aˆ) and Epk(bˆ), and a cloud server C2 with the private key sk,
where aˆ and bˆ are two bits not known to C1 and C2. The Secure
OR (SOR) protocol [12] securely computes encrypted result of the
bit-wise OR of the two bits, Epk(aˆ ∨ bˆ), such that only C1 knows
Epk(aˆ ∨ bˆ) and no information related to aˆ and bˆ is revealed to C1
or C2.
Secure AND (SAND). Assume a cloud server C1 with encrypted
input Epk(aˆ) and Epk(bˆ), and a cloud server C2 with the private key
sk, where aˆ and bˆ are two bits not known to C1 and C2. The goal
of the SAND protocol is to securely compute encrypted result of
the bit-wise AND of the two bits, Epk(aˆ ∧ bˆ), such that only C1
knows Epk(aˆ∧ bˆ) and no information related to aˆ and bˆ is revealed
to C1 or C2. We can simply use the secure multiplication (SM)
protocol on the two bits.
Secure NOT (SNOT). Assume a cloud server C1 with encrypted
input Epk(aˆ) and a cloud server C2 with the private key sk, where
aˆ is a bit not known to C1,C2. The goal of the SNOT protocol is
to securely compute the encrypted complement bit of aˆ, Epk(¬aˆ),
such that only C1 knows Epk(¬aˆ) and no information related to
aˆ is revealed to C1 or C2. Secure NOT protocol can be easily
implemented by Epk(1 − aˆ) = Epk(1)Epk(aˆ)
N−1.
Appendix B
Disclosure of Binary based SMIN
Given two numbers in binary representations, the idea of the
Binary representation based SMIN protocol (BSMIN)3 [12] is for
C1 to randomly choose a boolean functionality F (by flipping a
coin), where F is either a > b or b > a, and then securely compute
F with C2, such that the output of F is oblivious to both C1 and
C2. Based on the output and chosen F, C1 computes min(a, b)
locally using homomorphic properties. More specifically, given
3. The SMIN protocol for n values can be constructed by employing BSMIN
for two values at a time in a hierarchical fashion as suggested in [12] or simply
a linear fashion.
the binary representation of the two numbers, for each bit, C1
computes an encrypted boolean output Wi of the two bits based
on F (e.g., if F is a > b, Wi = Epk(1), if (a)
(i)
B
> (b)
(i)
B
and Epk(0)
otherwise) and an encrypted randomized difference between (a)
(i)
B
and (b)
(i)
B
. This way, the order and difference of the two numbers
are not disclosed to C2. However, when a = b, whatever F is,
we have Wi = Epk(0) for all bits. We can show that through the
intermediate result (the encrypted randomized difference between
(a)
(i)
B
and (b)
(i)
B
, Γi = Epk(ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, the bit-wise XOR of
(a)
(i)
B
and (b)
(i)
B
, Gi = Epk(0) for 1 ≤ i ≤ l), C2 can determine a
equals to b.
Appendix C
Disclosure of Perturbation based SMIN
The Perturbation based SMIN protocol (PSMIN) [47] assumes
C1 has Epk(a) and Epk(b). C1 generates a set of v random values
uniformly from a certain range {r1, ..., rv|r1 < ri, i ≥ 2}. C1 then
sends a set of 2 + v − 1 encrypted values {Epk(a + r1), Epk(b +
r1), Epk(x2+r2), ...,Epk(xv+rv)} to C2, where xi, i ≥ 2 are randomly
chosen from a, b. The idea is that the smallest number, after being
perturbed by r1 (which is smaller than ri, i ≥ 2), will remain the
smallest. The perturbation hides the order of the numbers to C2.
Although not mentioned by the original paper, we point out C1
also needs to shuffle the encrypted values before sending them to
C2, otherwise the differences between the values will be disclosed
to C2 after decryption. After decrypting those 2 + v − 1 values,
C2 takes the minimal min and sends Epk(min) to C1. C1 computes
Epk(min − r1) as result. The security weakness of PSMIN is due
to the fact that if two numbers are equal, their perturbed values
remain equal. Since C1 sends {Epk(a + r1), Epk(b + r1), Epk(x2 +
r2), ...,Epk(xv + rv)} to C2, C2 can learn two numbers are equal
based on a + r1 and b + r1.
Appendix D
Security Definition in the Semi-honest Model
Considering the privacy properties above, we adopt the formal
security definition from the multi-party computation setting under
the semi-honest model [16]. Intuitively, a protocol is secure if
whatever can be computed by a party participating in the protocol
can be computed based on its input and output only. This is formal-
ized according to the simulation paradigm. Loosely speaking, we
require that a party’s view in a protocol execution to be simulative
given only its input and output. This then implies that the parties
learn nothing from the protocol execution. For the detailed and
strict definition, please see [16].
Theorem 2. (Composition Theorem) [16]. If a protocol consists
of subprotocols, the protocol is secure as long as the subproto-
cols are secure and all the intermediate results are random or
pseudo-random.
In this work, the proposed secure skyline protocols are con-
structed based on a sequential composition of subprotocols. To for-
mally prove the security under the semi-honest model, according
to the composition theorem given in Theorem 2, one needs to show
that the simulated view of each subprotocol was computationally
indistinguishable from the actual execution view and the protocol
produces random or pseudo-random shares as intermediate results.
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Appendix E
Paillier Cryptosystem
We use the Paillier cryptosystem [34] as the encryption scheme
in this paper and briefly describe Paillier’s additive homomorphic
properties which will be used in our protocols.
• Homomorphic addition of plaintexts:
Dsk(Epk(a) × Epk(b) mod N
2) = (a + b) mod N
• Homomorphic multiplication of plaintexts:
Dsk(Epk(a)
b mod N2) = a × b mod N
It is easy to see that the Paillier cryptosystem is additively
homomorphic and we can compute a new probabilistic encrypted
Epk(a) given an encrypted Epk(a) without knowing the private key
sk.
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